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I. INTRODUCTION
As our society comes closer to a realization that litigation is only
one of many methods of dispute resolution, the role of alternative dispute
resolution is bound to increase. Arbitration has already emerged as a
strong federal concern which is no longer prepared to yield easily to other
federal interests. The Federal Arbitration Acte (the FAA) is experiencing
a rebirth after recent decisions of the Supreme Court. These decisions
turned this "dark horse" among the congressional enactments into a
"fighting vehicle" capable of "winning" against such potent opponents as
federal concerns arising under the antitrust laws, the securities laws, and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.2 No victory
will, however, be complete until the FAA successfully "takes on" the
federal bankruptcy law. That time appears to have arrived.
The federal bankruptcy law may come into conflict with the FAA
within a bankruptcy proceeding where the debtor in possession, or the
trustee,3 attempts to resolve a dispute regarding a bankruptcy-related
matter which arises under a pre-petition contract containing an arbitration
clause. First, a conflict between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code (the
Code) may arise because a stay of the bankruptcy proceeding pending
arbitration could interfere with the efficient administration of the
bankruptcy estate. Second, a conflict may also arise because enforcing a
valid arbitration clause could interfere with the general bankruptcy
principle that, for liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor to be
successful, the value of the bankruptcy estate must be maximized.
Surprisingly, courts analyzing-the conflict between the FAA and the Code
have completely overlooked this second source of conflict even though the
idea is lurking whenever executory contracts in bankruptcy are discussed.4
Courts and commentators have spent much time analyzing the
problem of enforcement of arbitration clauses against the trustee. Most
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
2. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844 (lst Cir.
1987), on remand from, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (claims arising under federal antitrust law);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (claims arising
under the Securities Act of 1933); ShearsonlAm. Express,Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO).
3. The term trustee will hereinafter include the debtor in possession.
4. E.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989).
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discussions focus on a conflict between the bankruptcy interest in having
bankruptcy-related matters resolved in a single proceeding' and the FAA's
mandate to stay the bankruptcy proceeding and proceed with arbitration."
As a result, courts unanimously held, prior to Hays and Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.," that a decision to compel or deny
arbitration was left to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge.5 The
courts based their decisions on the view that arbitration occupied a
position of lesser importance than bankruptcy in the hierarchy of federal
concerns. In addition, they considered arbitrators as incapable of
addressing complex issues and arbitration as ill-equipped to handle
disputes arising under the complex laws.
Inspired by the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/Am.
Exrpress, Inc. v. McMahon,9 which requires courts to rigorously enforce
arbitration agreements even in situations where a party to the agreement
raises a claim founded on statutory rights, the Third Circuit reversed its
seminal decision in Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 0 and held in
Hays that the district court was without discretion to deny the enforcement
of an arbitration clause." Moreover, the Third Circuit found that the
Code and the FAA were not in conflict as to whether to enforce, against
the trustee, a pre-petition arbitration agreement to resolve a dispute over a
bankruptcy-related matter. 2
5. To have bankruptcy-related matters resolved in a single proceeding has long been
considered synonymous with the efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate. S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5803-04.
6. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984) (Zimmerman and its progeny is still followed in everyjurisdiction that addressed the issue except in its own); Yochum, Arbitration Agreements in
Bankruptcy: A Mutant is Loose (Again!), Symptoms are Showing, A Palliative is Suggested,
19 STETSON L.REv. 137 (1989); William E. Deitrick, The Conflicting Policies Between
Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33 (1984); D. James Mackall, Comment,
Balancing Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act and Section 1471 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978: A Bankruptcy Judge's Exercise of "Sound Discretion", 53 U. CIN. L.
REV. 231 (1984); Carolyn C. Markason, Note, Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy
Proceedings: The Clash Between Policies and the Proper Forum for Resolution -
Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 57 TEMP. L.Q. 855 (1984).
7. Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d
Cir. 1989).
8. See, e.g., In re Guild Music Corp., 100 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1989); In re Win.
S. Newman Brewing Co., Inc., 87 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1988); In re Double TRL,
Inc., 65 B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1986); In re Continental Airline Corp., 60 B.R. 472
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
9. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
10. Zimmerman, 712 F.2d 55.
11. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149. In Hays, a securities broker moved the court to compel a
Chapter I 1 trustee to arbitrate the trustee's claim against the broker. The claim arose out of
a pre-petition contract containing an arbitration clause.
12. Id. at 1161.
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This Note will discuss enforcement against trustees of pre-petition
arbitration agreements with respect to issues that, upon filing of a petition,
become matters related to the bankruptcy case rather than matters
exclusively within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Part II of this Note
will examine the FAA's policy in favor of arbitration as well as the
general principle of the bankruptcy law that for liquidation or
rehabilitation of the debtor to be successful, the value of the bankruptcy
estate must be maximized. Part II will also demonstrate that the Code
may indeed come into conflict with the FAA. Part III will examine the
Third Circuit's decision in Hays, focusing on arbitration of bankruptcy-
related matters. Furthermore, Part M will analyze and critique the Third
Circuit's holdings and its reasoning. Finally, Part IV will articulate a test
to resolve the conflict between the Code and the FAA.
II. PRE-PEITrION AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AND
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: DO THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND THE BANKRUrcY
CODE CONFLICT?
A. Arbitration Agreements within the FAA
To provide a speedy and inexpensive alternative to litigation,
Congress enacted the FAA. By enacting the FAA, Congress intended to
"revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ... "13
Section 2 of the FAA accomplishes this purpose by placing arbitration
agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts. "1 4  It provides that
arbitration agreements shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable except
for such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. "' Section 3 of the FAA requires a court, upon application, to
stay its proceedings if an issue before the court is subject to a valid
arbitration agreement.
The plain language of the FAA allows no exceptions to its stay
provisions. Until recently, however, the courts were quick to modify the
FAA by having it yield to other federal concerns arising under the federal
antitrust laws,"6 the securities laws, 7 or actions brought under the
13. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
14. Id. (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, (1924)).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
16. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 723 F.2d 155; Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act."8 The courts based
such modified readings of the FAA in part on the belief that arbitrators
were not able to properly apply complex laws, and additionally on the
belief that arbitration was inadequately equipped to handle the resolution
of disputes arising under such laws.19
Recent years have witnessed a major change in the significance
attached to those policies underlying the FAA and its impact on other
federal concerns. The Supreme Court eliminated the implied exception to
the FAA in the area of arbitration of disputes arising out of securities
laws. °  The Court expressly repudiated its view that arbitrators are
incapable of addressing complex issues and that arbitration is ill-equipped
to handle disputes arising under complex laws.2 1 The recent decisions of
the Supreme Court in the area of securities law cast doubt on whether
other implied exceptions to the FAA will survive much longer."
In McMahon, the Supreme Court reexamined the enforceability of
contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes between customers and
brokers arising under the federal securities laws. The Court held that the
FAA establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, which requires the
courts to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements.Y It further held that
this duty is not diminished when a party bound by the agreement raises a
claim founded on statutory rights. The Supreme Court went on to say
that, like any other statutory directive, the FAA's mandate may be
overridden by a contrary congressional command.
Thus, to defeat the application of the FAA, a party opposing
arbitration must demonstrate that Congress intended to make an exception
to the FAA for claims arising under some other federal statute.
Congress' intention to make an exception to the FAA must be discernible
from the text, the history, or the inherent conflict between arbitration and
the underlying purposes of the statute.24
17. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
18. S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983), af'd, 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
19. Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, 430.
20. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
21. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-33 (1987).
22. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (claims arising under the Securities Act of
1933); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
23. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
24. Id.
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B. The Bankruptcy Code
For those who are obsessed with logic and clarity, perhaps the best
way to construct a clear and logical edifice of bankruptcy law is to
establish several general principles. The next step would be to design a
means to implement these general principles. The Code represents a
means and is not simply a statement of such principles. One of the
general principles of bankruptcy law is that for liquidation or rehabilitation
of the debtor to be successful, the value of the bankruptcy estate must be
maximized.
1. Rejection of Executory Contracts.
The Code provides a number of vehicles to arrive at the maximum
value for the bankruptcy estate. These vehicles are designed to relieve the
bankruptcy estate from certain obligations of the debtor or liens against
the property, or to avoid particular transfers that are damaging to the
estate. Because contracts are the major means through which business
activities have been conducted for centuries, a policy that does not allow a
trustee to dispose of performance on certain types of contracts that happen
to be burdensome to the bankruptcy estate would in most circumstances
stand in the way of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.
Therefore, it must come as no surprise that the Code allows the trustee
either to assume or reject executory contracts of the debtor.2' This
rejection constitutes a breach of the contract5 and is subject to the
Bankruptcy Court's approval?
In deciding whether to approve the rejection of an executory
contract most courts apply the business judgement rule. 2 Under this rule,
a trustee may reject an executory contract if the rejection is advantageous
to the bankruptcy estate.9 Applying the business judgment rule, most
25. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
28. 2 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 365.03 (15th ed. 1990). A much stricter standard
applies, however, to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements because of the "special
nature" of such contracts. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); 11
U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
29. A minority of the courts will allow the trustee to reject an executory contract only
if the contract must resIt in an actual loss to the bankruptcy estate. 2 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.03 (15th ed. 1990). A few courts require a showing that rejection will benefit the
general unsecured creditors. E.g., Infosystems Technology, Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc.,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,899, 71,900, (D. Mass. June 25, 1987). For a detailed
discussion of standards governing rejection of executory contracts in bankruptcy, see
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 'Rejection', 59 U.
COLO. L. REv. 845, 895-901 (1988).
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courts will not second-guess the trustee's decision to reject an executory
contract unless the decision involved bad faith or a gross abuse of
discretion.' In addition, the bankruptcy court is a court of equity. As a
result, the Code grants broad equitable powers to the bankruptcy judge.3
2. Arbitration Clause as an Executory Contract.
Although the Code allows a trustee to assume or reject executory
contracts, 32 it does not define the term "executory contract." Most courts
follow the definition suggested by Professor Countryman: An executory
contract is one where the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are thus-so-far unperformed and where the failure of
either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing performance by the other party. 3  Professor Countryman's
definition is known as the material breach test.
Some courts are willing to overlook performance by the nondebtor
party, and consider the contract executory if the debtor has a significant
obligation yet to be performed other than payment of money.34 Other
courts examine the purpose of the rejection and base their decision of
whether to enforce the executory contract on the possibility of the
accomplishment of such an objective?' In short, if a rejection of a
contract benefits the bankruptcy estate, then the contract is executory.
Finally, one commentator who has written extensively in this field,
suggests that the time has come to extend the trustee's power that allows
one to assume or reject an executory contract to all bankruptcy contracts.3
30. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 79 (3d
Cir. 1982), af'd sub nom N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); 2 COWIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03 (15th ed. 1990).
31. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 note 5 (West Supp.
1991) (Equitable Considerations).
32. The trustee cannot discard an arbitration clause just because the trustee was not a
party to the agreement. The trustee succeeds to all contractual rights and obligations of the
debtor. In addition, the Code provides the trustee with certain powers which enable the
trustee to deal with the debtor's contracts and property in a manner not available to the
debtor. E.g., N.L.R.B., 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983) (rejecting a theory that a trustee is a "new
entity"); see also Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and
Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. R. 595, 618-19 (1983).
33. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973).
34. In re Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 45 B.R. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
Norquist, 43 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984).
35. In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978).
36. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 230.
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Addressing the legislative history of the term "executory contract,"
the Supreme Court observed:
The Bankruptcy Code furnishes no express
definition of an executory contract, [see] 11
U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 ed.), but the legislative
history of § 365(a) indicates that Congress
intended the term to mean a contract "on which
performance remains due to some extent on
both sides." H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, p. 347
(1977); [see] S.Rep. No. 95-989, p. 58
(1978)Y
The notion that a contract is executory if performance remains due on
both sides is consistent with the material breach test suggested by
Professor Countryman.
Courts and commentators often encounter problems in properly
applying the material breach test to a contract containing an arbitration
clause. They are extremely reluctant to find a contract executory, and
thus to allow the trustee to reject such a contract, where the only
obligation that remains is a promise to arbitrate disputes. Their reasoning
is either unclear or does not go further than state that the contract does
not satisfy the material breach test because a failure to arbitrate disputes is
simply not a material breach.'
The material breach test is easily satisfied in the situation where
the only unperformed obligation under the contract is a promise to
arbitrate disputes. The failure of either party to submit to arbitration
constitutes a material breach because performance by the other party
would be excused.
On the other hand, regardless of whether a contract containing an
arbitration clause is executory, the trustee may reject the arbitration clause
because it represents a separate executory contract. Much confusion in
the application of the material breach test appears to result from the lack
of clear understanding that a contract containing an arbitration clause is in
fact actually two separate contracts. Thus, before discussing the
application of the material breach test to a pre-petition contract containing
an arbitration clause, it is necessary to explore how many contracts are
actually present in such a case written document.
37. N.L.R.B., 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6.
38. E.g., In re Monge Oil Corp., 83 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Yochum,
Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Mutant is Loose (Again!), Symptoms are Showing,
a Palliative is Suggested, 19 STETSON L. REV. 137, 154 n.64 (1989).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Suppose two parties entered into a contract. Because the parties
failed to provide for the arbitration of the disputes arising out of that
contract, they later enter into a separate arbitration agreement. Here, this
separate arbitration agreement is undoubtedly an executory contract
because it satisfies the material breach test, i.e., the obligations of both
parties are unperformed and the failure of either party to complete
performance would constitute a material breach, excusing performance by
the other party.
Consider a slightly more complicated situation where a contract
contains an arbitration clause. Under state law, "[t]he mere fact that a
transaction is evidenced by one document is not alone sufficient to require
the result that there is a single entire contract and not several separate
contracts."3 9  The intentions of the parties control the issue of whether
there is a single contract or several separate contracts.4
Although the question of severability is ordinarily one of state law,
arbitration clauses within the FAA's coverage 41 are, as a matter of federal
law, separable "from the contracts in which they are imbedded" unless the
parties to the contract agree otherwise. 2  Under the doctrine of
severability adopted by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co.," an arbitration clause represents an independent
contractual obligation of the parties. As such, it is a "classic executory
contract" because an arbitration clause satisfies Professor Countryman's
material breach test, i.e., obligations of both parties to arbitrate disputes
39. Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1950) A case applying
Pennsylvania law has been chosen to support the proposition in the text because the Hays
case is a Third Circuit decision.
40. Shinn v. Bodine, 60 Pa. 182 (1869).
41. To be within the FAA's coverage, an arbitration clause must be either a part of a
maritime transaction or a contract in commerce, or must deal with controversies arising out
of such transactions. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
42. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967)
(Prima Paint Corporation ("Prima") filed an action in a federal court for rescission of the
contract containing an arbitration clause. In addition, Prima sought to enjoin Flood &
Conklin from proceeding with arbitration. Prima alleged that it had been fraudulently
induced into entering into the contract. The central issue of the case was whether a claim of
fraud in the inducement of the entire contract was to be resolved by a federal court, or
whether the matter had to be referred to arbitrators. Id. at 402. Having adopted the view of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that an arbitration clause, as a matter of federal
law, is separable from the entire contract in which it is embedded, the Supreme Court held
that the claim of fraudulent inducement had to be submitted to arbitration.); See also
Dougherty v. Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267, 273 (D. Del. 1987); Continental Service
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 997, 999 (M.D. La.
1987).
43. Hirshan, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1322-23 (1985); Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International
Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 623 (1983); Yochum, Arbitration
Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Mutant is Loose (Again!), Symptoms are Showing Palliative is
Suggested, 19 STETsON L. REV. 137, 143 (1989).
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are so unperformed that the failure of either party to arbitrate would
constitute a material breach excusing performance by the other party.
Because an arbitration clause is an executory contract, the trustee
may reject the contract if such a rejection benefits the bankruptcy estate
and falls within the trustee's sound business judgment."M Thus, the next
question is how the rejection of an arbitration clause could benefit the
bankruptcy estate. Specifically, how could rejection benefit the estate
when it is well recognized that arbitration is a less costly and more
expedient method of dispute resolution than litigation?
Undoubtedly, arbitration has its advantages. On the other hand, the
FAA does not provide for discovery in arbitration proceedings.4'
Moreover, the pretrial discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are not available to the parties in arbitration.4 If the trustee
asserts a cause of action on the pre-petition contract that requires
substantial discovery to be a success, then the trustee may want to reject
the contract.
C. Conflict between the FAA and the Code
The conflict between the FAA and the Code arises because these
two congressional commands may work in opposite directions.
Maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate may require the trustee to
reject a pre-petition agreement to arbitrate; whereas, the policy in favor of
arbitration will demand enforcement of such an agreement.
The rejection of an arbitration clause will constitute a breach of
contract. As a result, the nonbreaching party will have a claim against
the bankruptcy estate. Possible damages will include the difference
between a prospective recovery in a court of law, where the full pretrial
discovery is available, and a prospective award in an arbitration
proceeding, where, at best, only limited discovery is available. This
claim will be treated as a pre-petition claim relating back to the date
immediately before the filing of petitionf Most importantly, a court will
not render the remedy of specific performance against the trustee on such
a claim because granting such a remedy would strip the trustee from her
statutory power to reject executory contracts.
44. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28.
45. JAMES W. MOORE, J. D. LucAs & KENT SINCLAIR, JR., 7 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 81.05[7] (1990 & 1991 Supp.).
46. Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359
(S.D. N.Y. 1957); Katsoris, The Arbitration of Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 279, 287 n.52 (1984-85).
47. 11 U.S.C §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g) (1988).
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On the other hand, the FAA's mandate, which has been
strengthened by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, is clear:
Arbitration agreements must be enforced. 4 Under section 3 of the FAA,
the nonbreaching party will be entitled to the specific performance of the
arbitration clause.
III. HAYS AND CO. v. MERRILL LYNCH
The preceding discussion establishes a framework for analyzing the
issue of enforcement against the trustee of pre-petition arbitration
agreements in bankruptcy by exploring certain tensions between the FAA
and the Code. It also provides a vehicle to uncover flaws in the Third
Circuit's analysis of this issue.
In Hays, Monge Oil Corporation (Monge) entered into a Customer
Agreement with Merrill Lynch to invest in certain securities. Monge
allegedly advised Merrill Lynch that investments in the corporate accounts
were only to be in "long-term good quality" securities.9 The Customer
Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring all disputes between
the parties, arising out of their brokerage relationship, to be resolved
through arbitration.s"
Several years after the accounts were established, Monge filed for
relief under Chapter 11. Hays & Co. (Hays) was subsequently appointed
trustee for Monge. Hays thereafter filed an action in the district court
against Merrill Lynch alleging, inter alia, claims under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as well as common
law claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, gross
negligence, and conversion. st Merrill Lynch moved the district court to
stay the proceedings before the court and to compel arbitration of Hays'
claims.
48. Rodriguez de Quyas, 490 U.S. 477; McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
49. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149, 1150.
50. The Customer Agreement provided for arbitration to be conducted under the
provisions of the Constitution and Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., or pursuant to the Code of Arbitration Procedure of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Id. at 1153. Discovery procedures under the NYSE
Constitution and the NASD Code are practically the same, and they are very limited indeed.
THE CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC., reprinted in NASD SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL 3711 (CCH 1990). THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RULES OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE 4301 (CCH 1984).
51. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149, 1150.
[Vol. 7:1 1991]
FRE-FETITION ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
The district court denied Merrill Lynch's motion. Relying on the
Third Circuit's decision in Zimmerman, the court held that it had
discretion to nullify a mandatory arbitration clause where policies
underlying the FAA and the Code were in conflict.' Merrill Lynch
appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
To determine whether the Code implicitly modifies the FAA, the
Third Circuit proceeded to apply the standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McMahon.s4 The Third Circuit concluded that the trustee in
Hays did not meet the burden of showing that Congress had intended to
make an exception to the FAA.s The trustee knew of no provision in the
text of the Code that made arbitration clauses unenforceable. Similarly,
neither did the Third Circuit.m Furthermore, the trustee was unable to
prove that the legislative history of the Code evidenced Congress' intent to
make an exception to the FAA.Y
Finding no language in the text of the Code or its legislative
history to support the contention that Congress had intended an exception
to the FAA, the trustee was left to argue that a purpose of the Code
would be offended if arbitration were to be compelled here. According
52. Zimmerman, 712 F.2d 55. Prior to Zimmerman, the courts approached the problem
of whether to enforce arbitration agreements in bankruptcy in a manner that lacked
methodology. Since Zimmerman, every jurisdiction dealing with the enforcement of
arbitration clauses in bankruptcy cites Zimmerman and uses its methodology. In Zimmerman,
the debtor sued on a pre-petition contract containing an arbitration clause. The defendant
demanded a stay of the bankruptcy proceeding pending arbitration. To resolve a conflict, or
what at the time appeared to be a conflict, between the two federal concerns, the Zimmerman
court analyzed the importance of the purposes underlying the FAA and the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. The Third Circuit noted in Zimmerman that the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 had expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in order to eliminate the
serious delays, expense, and duplications associated with the dichotomy between summary
and plenary jurisdiction. The court reasoned further that stays of proceedings pending
arbitration, required by the FAA, could result in delays, expenses, and duplications similar
to those previously experienced in bankruptcy proceedings because of the dichotomy between
plenary and summary jurisdiction. The Zimmerman court went on to say that, although
arbitration was a fundamental federal concern, it did not occupy a position of similar
importance in the hierarchy of federal concerns as did bankruptcy. The Third Circuit
concluded that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 must be read to modify implicitly the
FAA. As a result, the Third Circuit held in Zimmer an that, when the debtor sued on a
contract containing an arbitration clause and the other party to the contract demanded a stay
of the bankruptcy proceeding pending arbitration, the decision of whether to grant a stay was
left to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge.
53. In re Monge Oil Corp., 83 B.R. 305.
54. To defeat the application of the FAA, it must be demonstrated that, with respect to
a particular federal concern, Congress intended to make an exception to the FAA. Congress'
intention must be evidenced by the text, legislative history, or purposes of the other statute.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
55. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149, 1158.
56. Id. at 1157.
57. Id.
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to the trustee in Hays, the efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate
was such a purpose.
Indeed, concerns over the efficient administration of the
bankruptcy estate prompted Congress to enact the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. To eliminate delays, expense, and duplication associated with
the then existing dichotomy between summary and plenary jurisdiction and
to facilitate the efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate, Congress
expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to have all bankruptcy
matters resolved in a single proceeding s
The Hays court was not, however, receptive to this argument
because the trustee failed to demonstrate that enforcing the arbitration
clause would have any adverse impact on the efficient administration of
the bankruptcy estate. Moreover, the court suggested that limitations on
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts imposed by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 indicated an erosion in
Congress' intent to have all bankruptcy-related matters resolved in a single
bankruptcy proceeding.
A contrary reading of the "1984 Amendments" has been suggested
by several commentators.5 9  Faced with a constitutional problem,
Congress did not abandon its goal of eliminating inefficiency in the
bankruptcy system. Accordingly, the purpose of the "1984 Amendments"
was not to undercut the strong bankruptcy policy of having bankruptcy-
related matters adjudicated in a single proceeding, but rather their purpose
was to bring federal bankruptcy law into compliance with constitutional
requirements.
As the Third Circuit applied the McMahon standard to the case at
bar, it found no indication of Congress' intent to make an exception to the
FAA with respect to bankruptcy-related claims brought by the trustee.
The Third Circuit would, however, allow an exception if enforcement of
the arbitration clause was to seriously jeopardize one of the purposes of
the Code.61 Finally, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's holding
58. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5803, 6010.
59. Yochum, Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Mutant is Loose (Again!),
Symptoms are Showing, A Palliative is Suggested, 19 STETSON L. REv. 135, 155 (1989);
Markason, Note, Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Clash Between
Policies and the Proper Forum for Resolution - Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 57
TEMP. L.Q. 855. 883 (1984).
60. As Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to reduce serious
delay, expense, and duplication, it did not, however, confer the Article Ill judicial status on
the bankruptcy judges. Absence of the Article III judicial status for the bankruptcy judges
created a major constitutional problem. As a result, the Supreme Court held the expanded
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
61. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149, 1161.
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that the district court had discretion to enforce the pre-petition arbitration
agreement against the trustee.
The Third Circuit's analysis in Hays is based on a policy
argument. Nevertheless, the court failed to consider that maximizing the
value of the estate, which is required for successful liquidation and
rehabilitation of the debtor, bears significantly on the issue of whether to
enforce a pre-petition arbitration clause against the trustee. As a result,
the Hays court overlooked the impact of section 365(a) of the Code on the
factual situation in Hays.'
If the Third Circuit had analyzed the problem of enforcement of
arbitration clauses in bankruptcy from the perspective of maximizing the
benefit to the estate, which allows the trustee to reject executory
contracts, then the Third Circuit may have found a clear mandate in the
Code to deny enforcement of the arbitration clause." Thus, the Hays
court would have been left with two clear conflicting congressional
commands.
The Third Circuit's analysis is also troublesome because it changes
the standard of review on appeal. In Zimmerman, the decision to stay the
bankruptcy proceeding and enforce the arbitration clause against the
trustee was left to the court's discretion." Therefore, the standard of
review on appeal was whether the court's exercise of discretion was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
After Hays, at least in the Third Circuit, the decision to enforce or
deny enforcement of an arbitration clause will no longer be a discretionary
one. The standard of review on appeal becomes the search for a simple
62. The trustee sought to reject the Customer Agreement with Merrill Lynch in the
bankruptcy court. The official committee of unsecured creditors supported the trustee's
motion. To determine whether the Customer Agreement was an executory contract, the
bankruptcy judge applied the material breach test of Professor Countryman and held that the
Customer Agreement was not executory. In re Monge Oil Corp., 83 B.R. 305. It seems,
however, that the material breach test is easily satisfied here. Under the Customer
Agreement, the only unperformed obligation of either party was to arbitrate disputes. These
obligations to arbitrate disputes were so far unperformed that if either party failed to
arbitrate, the other would be excused from arbitrating. In addition, regardless of whether the
Customer Agreement is executory, the arbitration clause, as a separate contract, is clearly an
executory contract. The arbitration clause easily satisfies the material breach test. For a
detailed discussion of the executoriness of an arbitration clause as a separate contract, see
supra, note 38 and accompanying text at 12-14. The decision of the bankruptcy judge was
not appealed. If the Third Circuit had realized its importance, then the court could have
considered this issue on its own motion because its power on appeal to review conclusions of
law is plenary.
63. If the Third Circuit or the lower court had inquired into the very limited discovery
procedure permitted under the Customer Agreement, they may have found that lack of full
discovery made a significant difference with respect to at least some causes of action
asserted by the trustee in Hays. The lower court could have estimated the dollar amount the
trustee in Hays was to collect, if the trustee proceeded either in court or with arbitration.
64. Zimmerman, 712 F.2d 55.
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legal error. This change in the standard of review on appeal will, in all
likelihood, encourage more litigation.
The Supreme Court in McMahon appears to have taken away the
bankruptcy judge's discretion to resolve a conflict between the FAA and
the Code.6 As a result, the Hays court held that the bankruptcy court did
not have discretion to grant or deny enforcement of the arbitration clause.
The Hays court had to follow the standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McMahon, however, the Hays court could have preserved the
bankruptcy judge's discretion in striking a balance between the FAA and
the Code.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
Suppose that a conflict between the FAA and the Code does exist,
and the situation is such that a nondebtor requests the Bankruptcy Court to
enforce a valid pre-petition arbitration agreement with respect to a
bankruptcy-related claim against a trustee. Additionally, the trustee had
exercised sound business judgement and rightfully rejects the arbitration
agreement. 66 The major question thus becomes how the conflict between
the two important federal concerns ought to be resolved.
Prior to recent decisions by the Supreme Court which interpreted
the FAA as imposing on the courts a duty to rigorously enforce arbitration
agreements, the decision of whether to enforce an arbitration agreement as
to bankruptcy-related matters was left to the sole discretion of the
bankruptcy judge. Often this discretion was exercised in a manner
strongly biased in favor of bankruptcy concerns.
The new philosophy of the Supreme Court toward arbitration
clearly rejects such a lopsided approach disfavoring arbitration. Echoing
the Supreme Court's new philosophy, the Third Circuit observed in Hays
that "[w]e can no longer subscribe to a hierarchy of congressional
concerns that places the bankruptcy law in a position of superiority over
65. Under McMahon, the court must ascertain whether Congress intended to make an
exception to the FAA. If the court finds that Congress intended no exception to the FAA,
then the federal bankruptcy law must yield to the FAA. Otherwise, the conflict between the
FAA and the Code must be resolved in favor of the Code. The standard does not allow for
any discretion on the part of the bankruptcy judge to resolve the conflict. For a contrary
reading of McMahon, see In re Chorus Data Systems, Inc., 122 B. R. 845, 851 (Bankr. D.
N.H. 1990). For a discussion of the standard, see supra, notes 13-24 and accompanying text
at 5-8.
66. As to standards for rejection, see supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text at 9-
10.
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th[e] [Arbitration] Act."67 However, resolution of the conflict between the
FAA and the Code will not be an easy task in the post-McMahon world.
If the test articulated by the Hays court is then taken literally to
allow enforcement of arbitration clauses against the trustee unless such
enforcement seriously jeopardizes the objectives of the Code, then
bankruptcy concerns are downgraded to a second-rate status. But, it does
not appear from McMahon that the Supreme Court is willing to go that far
in eliminating the skepticism towards arbitration.B
Any attempt to resolve the conflict must take into account a strong
policy in favor of arbitration enunciated in recent Supreme Court
decisions, as well as the preservation of the integrity of the fundamental
policies underlying the Code. An accommodation of the two federal
interests can be accomplished by increasing the threshold at which the
mandate of the FAA, which requires enforcement of arbitration
agreements, yields to the Code's fundamental concerns of successful
liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor. Such an accommodation will
allow a bankruptcy judge some discretion in striking a balance between
the FAA and the Code. However, the bankruptcy judge's discretion
should only be exercised after a meaningful threshold requirement has
been met by the party opposing arbitration.
One way to increase the threshold is to require compliance with a
stricter standard than the business judgement rule. A stricter standard has
already been instituted as a response to the rejection of collective
bargaining agreements in bankruptcy proceedings.69 The special nature of
collective bargaining agreements created a tension between the trustee's
power to reject executory contracts and judicial concerns over the rights
of employees. 70
At present, the standard of the business judgment rule is easy to
satisfy. Most courts will not second-guess the trustee unless the trustee's
decision involves bad faith or gross negligence.7' A stricter standard may
require the trustee to show, for example, that a proceeding in court will
likely result in a significant benefit to the bankruptcy estate. If the trustee
fails to meet this "revised business judgment test" then the arbitration
67. Hays, 885 F.2d 1149, 1161.
68. Under McMahon, the FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration may be overridden by a
contrary congressional command if Congress intended to make an exception to the FAA.
Congress' intent must be discernible from the text, history, or purposes of the contrary
congressional command. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227. To infer Congressional intent, the
Supreme Court, however, does not require a showing of a serious infringement on the
objectives of some other statute.
69. Collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts. N.LR.B., 465 U.S. 513.
70. See COLWER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28.
71. See COLER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28.
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clause must be enforced. If, however, the trustee succeeds in meeting the
requirements of the test, then the bankruptcy court will exercise its
equitable powers' and grant its approval of the trustee's decision to reject
the arbitration clause.
V. CONCLUSION
Lack of discovery in arbitration will continue to be a source of
tension between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code in a situation where
the trustee attempts, within the bankruptcy proceeding, to resolve a
dispute regarding a bankruptcy-related matter and arising under a pre-
petition contract containing an arbitration clause. With respect to certain
causes of action, recovery depends to a great extent on the availability of
discovery. As to these causes of action, the Code requires the trustee to
reject the pre-petition arbitration agreement and to seek recovery in court,
so as to maximize the benefit to the bankruptcy estate. At the same time,
the FAA requires the bankruptcy court to issue a stay of the proceeding
and to proceed with arbitration.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit in Hays overlooked the conflict.
As a result, it did not offer any direction for analysis in this area which
will, undoubtedly, witness much more litigation in the near future.
Any resolution of the conflict between the FAA and the
Bankruptcy Code must reflect the new philosophy of the Supreme Court
towards arbitration. To require the trustee to meet a stricter standard than
that of the business judgment rule, before the trustee can reject an
arbitration clause contained in a pre-petition contract, is not only in line
with this new philosophy, but also preserves the integrity of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Zach Zunshine
72. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 note 5 (West Supp. 1991)(Equitable Considerations).
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